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Abstract
Recent discussions of emergence in physics have focussed on the use
of limiting relations, and often particularly on singular or asymptotic lim-
its. We discuss a putative example of emergence that does not fit into this
narrative: the case of phonons. These quasi-particles have some claim to
be emergent, not least because the way in which they relate to the under-
lying crystal is almost precisely analogous to the way in which quantum
particles relate to the underlying quantum field theory. But there is no
need to take a limit when moving from a crystal lattice based description
to the phonon description. Not only does this demonstrate that we can
have emergence without limits, but also provides a way of understanding
cases that do involve limits.
Introduction
‘Emergence’ is a tricky term, but an important one. Leaving aside its tradi-
tional philosophical use, the term has been widely used in the physics com-
munity at least since Anderson’s “More is Different” [1]. And there’s reason to
believe that the term latches on to something, and that that something is a philo-
sophically interesting trait which may be ascribed to a reasonably well-defined
cluster of phenomena. Philosophers of physics have thus rightly offered var-
ious analyses of emergence. As none of these analyses cover the full range of
examples to which the term applies, we suggest that they fail to capture an im-
portant feature of emergence. In what follows, we’ll look at one such example,
that of the emergence of phonons in a crystal, argue that it isn’t well-captured
by accounts of emergence that rely on the presence of limits or essential ideali-
sations, and suggest an account that might do better.
Perhaps the broadest definition of emergence in the philosophy of physics
literature comes from Jeremy Butterfield, who tells us that emergent behaviour
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is behaviour that is “novel and robust relative to some comparison class” [13,
p.1065]. We’ll take this as a jumping off point for our analysis, but as Butter-
field is perfectly aware, the wide applicability of this definition lies in its lack
of specificity. It provides the scaffolding for a full account of emergence; an
analysis of novelty and robustness is needed to finish the construction. While
robustness is reasonably well understood and amounts to invariance under
relevant perturbations (see section 3.1), novelty has proved harder to spell out.
However, an account based on asymptotic limits has received particular atten-
tion in recent years.
This account suggests that behaviour is novel (and robust) relative to some
more fine-grained (lower-level) behaviour when the higher-level mathemat-
ics is derived from the lower-level mathematics via an asymptotic limit; see
e.g. [6, 9, 13, 14]. Phase transitions have been held to be emergent in this
sense, because relating this thermodynamic behaviour to a statistical mechan-
ical description requires us to take the thermodynamic limit. In Butterfield’s
view, this kind of relationship allows a novelty that is compatible with (Nagel-
Schaffner) reduction:1
my meanings of ‘emergence’ and ‘reduction’ are in tension with
each other: since logic teaches us that valid deduction gives no new
“content”, how can one ever deduce novel behaviour? (Of course,
this tension is also shown by the fact that many authors who take
emergence to involve novel behaviour thereby take it to also in-
volve irreducibility.) My answer to this ‘how?’ question, i.e. my
reconciliation, will lie in the use of limits. ... the idea is that one
performs the deduction after taking a limit of some parameter: so
the main morals will be that in such a limit there can be novelty,
compared with what obtains away from the limit, and that (pace
some authors) this should count as reduction, not irreducibility.
[12, p.1068]
Butterfield further notes both that the limits of interest need not be asymp-
totic and that the account is unlikely to capture all putative examples of emer-
gence. But, despite this disclaimer, a casual reader of the literature would be
forgiven for thinking that limits (or even singular limits) were the only game
in town.
The fan of an asymptotic limits analysis faces a dilemma. On the one hand,
one can, with Batterman, hold that the use of an asymptotic limit indicates a
failure of reduction. But this makes the use of an asymptotic limit look mys-
terious at the lower level. Otherwise, one might agree with Butterfield that
emergence is compatible with reduction. But, in order to make this gel with
1Batterman, notably, disagrees with Butterfield on this point, taking the infinite idealisations
required in deriving the asymptotic limit to imply explanatory irreducibility; see [9, p.1033].
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the asymptotic analysis, we need to give some explanation of the applicabil-
ity of the limit in question. And these explanations often seem to dissolve the
novelty that made the asymptotic analysis look emergent in the first place. It’s
therefore helpful to look explicitly at an example of emergence that does not fit
the asymptotic limit mold: our case study will provide an example of a kind
of emergence that maintains explanatory novelty even in the face of reduction,
escaping the tension engendered by the asymptotic analysis.
Phonons are the remarkably particle-like vibrational modes of a crystal.
Their behaviour, and the way in which they are modelled, bears a startling
similarity to that of particles as described by quantum field theory. The re-
lation of quantum particles to the underlying quantum fields is often taken
to be a paradigm case of emergence, claims that phonons are emergent there-
fore carry considerable weight – such claims are further defended in section
2.2. But, as we’ll argue, it’s impossible to shoehorn the phonon example into
the standard narrative of asymptotic limits; although there are approximations
involved, they do not involve singular limits. Instead, we’ll argue that the
example is better captured by an account of novelty that focusses on novel ex-
planation. We’ll argue that the phonon description counts as novel because the
change to phonon variables makes novel abstractions available which allow for
novel explanations. As such the example fits well with an account of novelty
previously advocated in [24].
Section 1 discusses the relevant physics, starting with a simple example
of normal modes in masses on springs, which will serve to illustrate the way
in which a change of variable can facilitate explanation. We’ll then move on
to discuss the more complex example of phonons, emphasising the various
approximations and idealizations needed to move to the phonon description.
Section 2 examines how this physics fits with the asymptotic account. We’ll
argue first that the move to the phonon description does not involve limits in
any important sense, let alone singular ones. It does involve approximations
and idealizations, but these are not essential in the way that essential ideal-
isations accounts of emergence require. But phonons should nonetheless be
thought of as emergent phenomena; their connection to the derivation of par-
ticles in quantum field theory makes this particularly compelling.
In fact, as elaborated in section 3, the phonon example fits much better with
an account of emergence that takes the relevant sense of novelty to be explana-
tory novelty; in this section, the sense in which the phonon description is robust
is also evaluated. Thus we argue that phonons can be thought of as novel and
robust.
3
1 Some Important Variable Changes
Phonons are often called quasi-particles, and their particle-like behaviour will
be important to our presentation here. However, at their most basic, phonons
are modes of vibration in crystal lattices, and the move to a phonon description
is characterised by a change of variables that suitably simplifies the description
of these modes of vibration. This section introduces the physics of phonons in
a fairly standard way by first introducing another example – masses on springs
– which also makes use of a change of variables to simplify the description of
modes of vibration. Our aim here is not merely to summarise the physics, but
also to emphasise a particular feature of these variable changes: both allow us
to abstract in ways that are particularly helpful for explanation.
1.1 Masses on Springs
Consider the following, very simple, case of two particles of equal mass m
oscillating on springs with constants k and k′ as shown in the diagram:
Figure 1: Coupled masses on springs.
Their motion is characterised by the following equations:
mx¨1 = −kx1 − k′(x1 − x2) (1)
mx¨2 = −kx2 − k′(x2 − x1) (2)
Despite the simplicity of the model, the standard (and only straightfor-
ward) way to solve these equations involves transforming the variables,
η1 = x1 + x2
η2 = x1 − x2. (3)
One can thus convert equations (1) and (2) into linear uncoupled differential
equations for two simple harmonic oscillators:
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mη¨1 = −kη1 (4)
mη¨2 = −(k + 2k′)η2. (5)
If one makes the substitutions ω1 =
√
k/m, ω2 =
√
(k + 2k′)/m, these equa-
tions have the following solutions:
η1 = α1e
iω1t + α∗1e
−iω1t (6)
η2 = α2e
iω2t + α∗2e
−iω2t (7)
where α1, α∗1, α2 and α∗2 are set by initial conditions. These two equations and
their solutions characterise normal modes of the system, and general solutions
of the equations are superpositions of these normal modes. We’ll call the vari-
ables η1 and η2 that define these modes ‘normal mode variables’.
This system is much simpler than the phonon case. In particular, in the
phonon case, the move to normal mode variables will involve important ap-
proximations and, as we’ll see in section 3.2, it might be thought to exhibit
more novelty. But the case in hand suffices to highlight some aspects of the
interest and importance of normal modes. In addition, in writing down these
equations, we implicitly incorporate assumptions which may be seen as anal-
ogous to the harmonic approximation discussed below.
The change of variables described in equations (3) is obviously of great cal-
culational value. But it could be useful for other reasons too. For example,
the change of variables might aid the explanation of certain phenomena: sup-
pose (in a rather stretched example) that the central spring is composed of a
material that glows only when compressed, and that we seek to explain the
frequency with which the spring lights up with the system in steady state. If
we remain in the original displacement variables, any explanation of this phe-
nomenon will require two variables and two equations. But if we move to the
normal mode variables, only η2 and its associated equation are relevant. By
leaving out reference to η1, this explanation in terms of the normal mode vari-
ables abstracts away from irrelevant details in a way that an explanation based
on displacement variables cannot. This feature of a well-chosen change of vari-
ables is appealed to in [24] and plays a role in our analysis of the emergence of
phonons.
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Figure 2: Lattice vectors are defined on the left for a simple cubic Bravais lattice, and on the right
for a face-centred cubic Bravais lattice. Figure from [2, p.65,69]
1.2 Phonons
Needless to say, a real crystal lattice is a more complicated system than a pair
of masses on springs.2 Here we have a quantum system comprised of electrons
and different kinds of nuclei, arranged in a 3-D lattice. A number of approxi-
mations are required if we are to get a tractable description of normal modes.
We start with the adiabatic approximation, which assumes that we can treat elec-
tronic and nuclear degrees of freedom independently (because electron masses
are small and their velocities are fast relative to nuclear masses and velocities).
Using this approximation, the account that follows will focus only on nuclear
degrees of freedom and not electronic ones.
Now let’s outline the physics of a classical three-dimensional crystal with n
atoms. We could try to describe the vibrations of this crystal using 3n displace-
ment variables and 3n coupled differential equations. But, happily, a crystal is
a highly symmetric system, and things are a little easier than this. We start by
considering the unit cells of the crystal – the basic repeating unit with m atoms
– defined by the primitive translation vectors a1, a2 and a3; see figure 2. For a
very simple monatomic lattice,m = 1, for a very simple diatomic latticem = 2,
and so on. We need to consider enough of these unit cells to model inter-cell
interactions adequately, but we do little to change the physics if we impose pe-
riodic boundary conditions and consider only the cells in some larger supercell
containing N cells. In a 3-D lattice, we can impose a boundary condition after
N1, N2 and N3 (where N = N1N2N3) repetitions of the translation vectors a1,
a2 and a3 respectively. Exploiting this translational symmetry means we now
2This section should be treated with the usual philosophy of physics proviso. Our aim here
is not to teach the reader solid state physics, but merely to highlight some selected features of
philosophical interest. The reader unfamiliar with the physics and interested in more detail should
look at e.g.[22, Ch.4].
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have 3Nm < n coordinates uLsα, where L labels the cell, s labels the atom
within the cell and greek indices label the cartesian components of displace-
ment vectors. Although in some cases this reduces the number of coordinates,
in many cases the supercell is taken to be of the order of the size of the crystal
itself. Moreover, merely reducing the number of coordinates involved in the
problem does little to make it calculationally tractable: more simplification is
needed.
We therefore make a further approximation: the harmonic approximation. We
assume that atomic displacements are small relative to interatomic distances.
This allows us to expand the potential energy function in terms of the inter-
atomic distances and drop terms above second order. If we now derive equa-
tions of motion from the Lagrangian in the usual way, we have a (very!) large
set of coupled differential equations. The key to uncoupling these is – in close
analogy with the method used for the masses on springs – to look for wave
solutions, and then look for variables distinguished by wavevector k rather
than by the individual atoms. This effectively moves us from the real lattice to
the reciprocal lattice, related by a discrete Fourier transform to the original. The
result is a set of normal mode variables qkj labelled by their wavevectors k,
with an additional index j that tells us whether the mode described is optical
or acoustic. When redescribed in terms of these variables, our original problem
becomes one of a series of uncoupled harmonic oscillators; each normal mode
variable obeys the equation of motion:
q¨kj = −ω2kjqkj (8)
Each of these variables corresponds to a particular mode of vibration of the
crystal, and the atomic displacements naturally described by our original coor-
dinates can be captured as linear combinations of the vibrational modes. Our
normal mode variables are sometimes called phonons, but there’s an ambigu-
ity in the terminology here: physics texts use the term ‘phonon’ to refer both
to the variables themselves, and to the normal modes of vibration associated
with them. This becomes particularly confusing when we talk about numbers
of phonons – the number of coordinates remains the same for a given model!
We’ll henceforth use the terms ‘phonon coordinate’ or ‘phonon variable’ to re-
fer to qkj and reserve the term ‘phonon’ for the physical modes themselves.
With the new variables in hand, we naturally describe the crystal not in
terms of individual atomic displacements, but in terms of aggregate properties
of the whole supercell. This is not because we’ve moved to fewer variables;
as noted above, there are 3Nm phonon coordinates just as there were 3Nm
displacement coordinates. Whilst we still have as many variables available
it turns out that certain behaviours (e.g. heat transport) can be characterised
very simply using only relevant phonon variables. This, to foreshadow, is an
abstraction which was unavailable before the variable change: had we con-
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tinued to work in the displacement variables, such behaviour may have been
inexplicable.
The phonon coordinates are just coordinates – linear combinations of the dis-
placement coordinates. It’s only in the harmonic approximation that they give
us perfectly uncoupled equations of motion, and hence only the harmonic ap-
proximation that allows us to derive them as a particularly interesting class of
variable, but there’s nothing to stop us using them to describe systems where
the approximation doesn’t apply. Once we have derived the phonon variables
using the harmonic approximation, we are free to relax the approximation, and
reintroduce terms beyond second order in the atomic displacement. These an-
harmonicities are essential to explaining the properties of real crystals, and, in-
deed, are essential to some of the most characteristically particle-like features
of phonons (although some of these will only become apparent once we move
to a quantum description). As temperatures increase, the harmonic approxima-
tion will become less and less accurate until, at some high temperature, normal
modes of vibration are no longer distinguishable even approximately. At this
point, we might say that the phonons themselves disappear, even though the
phonon variables still exist. But most interesting cases will lie somewhere in-
between; the ontology of phonons, like that of most physical phenomena, is a
fuzzy and approximate matter.
The description thus far has been entirely classical, and has given us no
reason to think of phonons as resembling particles. For this we need quan-
tum mechanics, specifically, we’d like to perform second quantisation on the
phonon mode variables qkj and their associated momenta pkj . Recall that our
phonon variables feature in independent harmonic oscillator equations. The
quantization procedure for a harmonic oscillator is part of elementary quan-
tum mechanics. Given some set of independent harmonic oscillators, we can
define operators that add or subtract a quantum of energy – these are some-
times known as creation and annihilation operators. A creation operator, aˆ†,
adds a quantum of energy, and increases the occupation number for a given
oscillator. The annihilation operator aˆ removes a quantum of energy and de-
creases the occupation number. Since our phonon problem is just a harmonic
oscillator problem, we can introduce creation and annihilation operators for
each vibrational mode picked out by a choice of k and j:
qkj =
√
~
2ωkj
(
a†−kj + akj
)
(9)
pkj = i
√
~ωkj
2
(
a†−kj − akj
)
(10)
We can now think of phonons as quanta of vibration with energy ~ω, and
of states of the crystal as characterised by phonon number state |nkj〉, which is
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raised and lowered by the creation and annihilation operators.3 The parallels
with the physics of photons will now be obvious to some readers; the above
equations could have been written for photons rather than phonons. And
indeed, once we reintroduce anharmonic terms, the mathematics of phonon-
phonon interaction is represented by diagrams which look remarkably particle-
like:
Figure 3: Diagrams for three phonon processes: for example the top-left diagram represents
aˆ†−k1j1 aˆk2j2 aˆk3j3 .
2 Phonons and Limits
Various authors have seen phonons as emergent [34, 36, 29, 16, 27]. In section
2.2, we’ll defend this claim more explicitly, but for the moment let’s simply note
that the claim seems relatively natural in the current context; we started with an
atomic lattice description, and moved to a description of particles which could
be thought of as interacting, both with other phonons and with other particles
such as neutrons and photons. The phonon description certainly seems novel,
and it’s robust insofar as it survives relaxations of the harmonic approximation.
Section 2.1 looks at whether this putative emergence can be captured by
the asymptotic limits account, and argues that it cannot. But section 2.2 argues
3|nkj〉 = 1√nkj ! (aˆ
†
kj)
nkj |0〉.
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that there are good reasons to consider phonons to be emergent nonetheless.
Finally, in section 3, we’ll argue that the novelty exhibited by the phonon de-
scription is best thought of as explanatory novelty.
2.1 Asymptotic Limits
What relation could the example of phonons possibly have to the asymptotic
limits literature? On the face of it, our derivation of the phonon picture in-
volved the taking of no limits, let alone singular ones. But it did involve a series
of approximations or idealizations: the harmonic approximation, the imposi-
tion of a periodic boundary condition, and the adiabatic approximation. Given
that the asymptotic limits analysis is related to discussions of essential ideal-
izations, it’s worth taking a look at the approximations used in the derivation
of the phonon description.
We start with a very basic presentation of what has become the paradigm
example of an asymptotic limit that signifies emergence: the use of the ther-
modynamic limit in connecting a thermodynamic description of phase transi-
tions with a statistical mechanical account. Thermodynamics tells us that phase
transitions occur when there is a discontinuity in a derivative of the free energy.
The statistical mechanical free energy function is analytic and can have no such
discontinuity. One solves the problem by taking the thermodynamic limit of
the free energy function – the limit of this function as the number of particles
tends to infinity. Real systems, of course, are composed of finitely many par-
ticles. There is a reasonable philosophical consensus [7, 9, 13, 14] that phase
transitions are novel phenomena of the kind required for emergence (where
the hallmark of emergence is novelty coupled with robustness). And many
commentators locate the source of the novelty in the use of the thermodynamic
limit.
Batterman thinks that the need for the limit shows that finite statistical me-
chanics cannot account for the phase transition. He claims that the limit is re-
quired in order to describe the emergent behaviour corresponding to the phase
transition: that is, one may locate the phase transition only after the limit has
been taken. Butterfield thinks that the limit flags a novel behaviour that in
fact emerges, albeit weakly, in finite systems before the limit. But both agree
that novelty springs from two related features: that limits are used in deriving
phase transitions, and that the relevant limit is singular. All agree that it is cru-
cial that there is a contrast between behaviour in large but finite systems and
infinite systems; a large gradient in the derivative of the free energy is not the
same thing as an actual non-analyticity.
Perhaps basing our asymptotic account on this one example is unfair. There
is a broader but connected literature on essential idealizations that might pro-
vide the basis for something like the asymptotic limits account. The essential
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idealizations literature stresses that the representation of some phenomena re-
quires the incorporation of false assumptions into our physical models; such
assumptions cannot be de-idealised in the sense discussed in McMullin [28].
There has been much discussion of phase transitions and essential idealiza-
tions, but no explicit connection of essential idealizations with the novelty re-
quired for emergence, although the work of Sorin Bangu (e.g. [3]) seems some-
times to hint at this. In fact, we find it difficult to view anything in the essential
idealizations literature as an account of emergence – essential idealizations in-
volve representational failures exhibited by our models; this does not look like
a good recipe for novelty.
Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness here, we’ll consider the idea that
novelty somehow arises whenever the derivation of a phenomenon from the
lower level involves an essential idealization, that is, an idealization that cannot
be de-idealized without losing the phenomenon in question. We’ll see that
even if essential idealizations did lead to novelty, the derivation of the phonon
description does not involve such idealizations.
Much subtlety has been glossed over in the above, and there is no univocal
account in the literature of exactly how to characterise the purported novelty of
phenomena like phase transitions. But we can use this rough sketch as a com-
parator for our phonon physics: can anything like the accounts above capture
the sense in which phonon behaviour is novel? Do any of the approximations
required for the derivation either look like essential idealizations or involve sin-
gular limits?
In order to evaluate this we should first make clear the distinction between
approximation and idealization. Here, we will follow John Norton [30] in defining
approximation as involving an “inexact description of a target system” and
idealization as involving reference to “another system whose properties provide
an inexact description of the target system”.4
Let us move on to our evaluation of the approximations involved in the
derivation of the phonon description. Might some of these involve singular
limits, or be idealizations in disguise? We start with the harmonic approx-
imation. Recall that this approximation depends on assuming that the dis-
placement of the atoms in the lattice is very small in comparison to the lattice
spacing: 〈u2〉  a2 where a is the lattice spacing and u is the atomic displace-
ment.5 This breaks down as temperatures approach the melting temperature
of the solid. Once the harmonic approximation has been made, and we have
transformed to a set of decoupled equations in phonon variables, so-called an-
harmonic terms may be re-introduced – these are crucial for the modelling of
4A third category, abstraction, which has sometimes been called “Aristotelian idealization” [28],
will be relevant in section 3. This involves the stripping away, or throwing out, of features in our
explanations and representations.
5There are systems for which this assumption doesn’t lead to the harmonic approximation: for
example, quantum hydrogen and helium crystals.
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phonon-phonon interactions and in order for phonons to have finite mean free
paths, these thus play crucial explanatory roles. Such anharmonicities may be
expressed as terms of the adiabatic potential beyond second order in the dis-
placement variable expansion.
One could scarcely find a more standard style of approximation in physics.
And on the face of it, there are no limits applied at all. But might one be able to
think of the approximation as a limit of some sort nonetheless? It’s hard to see
how. The value of this approximation relies on not taking the limit of the ratio
that we take to be small; in the limit, there would be no reason to reintroduce
higher order terms, and most equations would reduce to triviality. And even if
there is some way of shoehorning this kind of approximation into limits talk,
there are two reasons why the friend of singular limits should not go down this
route. For one thing, there’s no reason to think there are singular limits around,
and most commenters agree that it is the singularity of the thermodynamic
limit that is relevant to novelty. And for another, these kinds of approximation
are endemic in physics – if these lead to emergence, then emergence would be
so ubiquitous as to be utterly un-interesting.
What of idealization, essential or otherwise? The case above seems to be a
classic case of approximation. The description depends on a ratio being small,
and thus certain higher order terms being negligible. These things are literally
true of the target system; no further idealized system is required. The point
at which approximation comes in is the point at which we set higher order
terms to zero; this, of course, is not literally true. But all reference is to the
original system, hence, in Norton’s terms, we are discussing approximation,
and a humdrum approximation at that. It’s worth emphasising that while this
approximation is central to standard derivations of the phonon description,
limited de-approximation is essential to recover phonons with realistic proper-
ties. Thus it would be a mistake to regard the harmonic approximation as an
essential idealization.
Next, consider the periodic boundary condition: imposing a boundary con-
dition like this involves no limits, singular or otherwise. Might it be an ideal-
ization? Perhaps. But it is certainly not an essential one. There is no particular
size of supercell at which we must set the periodic boundary; pragmatic con-
siderations are the only issue here. We can set the boundaries as wide as we
like – indeed, they could be of the order of the size of the crystal. There’s no
question that normal modes can be defined for large boundaries.
However, the imposition of periodic boundary conditions does involve an
idealization of sorts, because it allows us to deal with a model of the crys-
tal without edges which might have otherwise affected the description of the
phonons. This idealization is related to the more basic assumption that each
cell of the crystal has identical properties – this is not true of any real crystals.
Essential idealization claims in this context can be dispelled by observing that
we can, here, de-idealize: small defects, imperfections and edge effects can
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be introduced without undermining the physical picture developed above.6
Large defects or widespread imperfections may lead to modelling failures, but
the behaviour of the real systems thus represented would deviate from stan-
dard phonon behaviour and, as such, the assumption of no large defects is
justified.
The adiabatic approximation is also invoked in the derivation of the phonon
description. Recall that this means that the electron states and nuclear motion
dynamically decouple. This allows us to start from the assumption that the to-
tal system wavefunction is the product of the nuclear and electronic wavefunc-
tions, to solve for this assumption, and to reintroduce interaction effects into
the potential perturbatively. But it is an approximation in just the same sense
as the harmonic approximation. Again, if limits were introduced to model this
approximation they would be both gerrymandered and non-singular, and no
idealization is involved.
2.2 Are Phonons Really Emergent?
So the phonon example does not fall neatly under an asymptotic limit analy-
sis of emergence. Should phonons nevertheless be considered emergent? We
think so, at least if one is amenable to the notion of emergence more generally.
Granted, there are those who will define emergence in such a way that phonons
do not fall under the definition; any definition (for example Batterman’s) that
precludes the compatibility of emergence and reduction will do this. But, if we
stick with our original analysis of emergence as novel and robust behaviour,
there is reason to think that phonons are not merely a phenomenon that has
been called emergent, but rather a phenomenon that stands to be particularly
revealing as to the nature of the novelty involved in emergence. In section 3 we
articulate the kind of novelty that phonons display. But, first, in this section,
we defend the claim that phonons deserve to be called ‘emergent’, even before
we give an analysis of their novelty.
The relation that phonons hold to the underlying crystal description is al-
most identical to the relation that quantum particles hold to the underlying
quantum field. And if any inter-theoretic relation betokens an interesting emer-
gence, surely the relationship between quantum particles and the field does.
Phonons are bosons and behave as such. The superficial resemblance be-
tween the physics of phonons and the physics of photons is striking (though
many other bosons would allow for an equally striking analogy). Both obey
Bose-Einstein statistics. Both contribute quanta of energy ~ω, and the energy of
6[22, §1.5.2] is a brief taxonomy of crystal defects, Kantorovich later discusses how crystal de-
fects can be taken into account as anharmonicities, and can otherwise lead to shorter mean free
paths of phonons. In the limit, defects will lead to an amorphous (non-crystalline) solid; see [33]
for a discussion of techniques for modelling phonons in amorphous solids.
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the quantum system depends on the number of photons or phonons. One can
even build a saser (sound amplification by stimulated emission of radiation)
much like a laser. But emergence is a relational property – phonons, if they are
emergent, are emergent by virtue of the relation between their physics and that
of the underlying crystal. It’s therefore much more compelling to look at the
way in which we derive a photon description from the electromagnetic field
in the standard model, and compare this to the way in which we derive the
phonon description. And here the similarities are much more than skin-deep.
It is no coincidence that quantum field theory (QFT) textbooks7 sometimes
begin with solid state physics and the physics of phonons. The process by
which we derive a particle description from a quantum field is much like the
one described in section 1.2. In particular, one looks for a normal modes de-
scription that allows one to describe the system in terms of independent har-
monic oscillators, and then derives a description with creation and annihilation
operators, and particle occupation numbers.
If one wants to deny that phonons are emergent, one must either deny
that the two cases are appropriately analogous, or deny that particles emerge
from quantum field theory. Start with the first option: how might one chal-
lenge the analogy? At a formal level, it is hard to drive a wedge between, say,
phonons and photons: the mathematics involved in both is strikingly similar,
as is the derivation if we simplify our cases a little, and compare phonons in a
monatomic crystal with particle states in massless scalar field theory.8
A challenge to the analogy will therefore need to come from elsewhere;
and if the inter-theoretic relation itself is analogous, any difference must some-
how lie in the nature of the phonons, photons, crystals and quantum fields
themselves. Doubtless some readers’ intuitions will push them to deny that
phonons should be taken as ontologically seriously as quantum particles. But
such attempts to block the analogy clearly beg the question; our analysis here
aims to demonstrate that phonons are a novel and robust phenomenon, and
thus, by the lights of the emergence programme, belong in the ontology at rel-
evant energies and length scales.
So we should look to the more fundamental level of description for any
prospective disanalogy. The most striking difference between the phonon case
and the case of quantum particles lies not in the description of the particles,
but in our access to the underlying field or lattice from which they are derived.
In the phonon case we have direct access to the physics of the crystal – we can
experimentally confirm the lattice physics itself. In the case of the quantum
field, our experimental evidence is often mediated via the particle description;
our major sources of evidence come from, for example, particle accelerators.9
7E.g. [26].
8See [34, p.7].
9One could deny even this distinction and claim that observation of, say, the arrangement of
iron filings around a bar magnet is fairly direct experimental evidence for the underlying quantum
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It is, however, difficult to see how one might move from this legitimate
disanalogy between phonons and quantum particles to an argument against
the emergence of phonons. Worries about the epistemic status of the quantum
field could shake our faith that there is a quantum field for particles to emerge
from; as a consequence one might become wary of an emergentist account of
quantum particles. But even if we grant such concerns, one could still mount
a case that phonons are an emergent phenomenon, and one might likewise
grant that if the status of the quantum field were settled satisfactorily, quantum
particles would look equally novel and robust with respect to that field.
The above style of argument does not, therefore, undermine the analogy
itself. But it might threaten our argument that we should accept phonons as
emergent because quantum particles clearly are. Some interpreters of quan-
tum field theory would deny that particles emerge from QFT at all. These de-
niers could fall into two camps. The first camp (exemplified by Doreen Fraser
[19]), holds that there are no particle states in realistic quantum field theories.
The second camp contains those who hold that particles, rather than fields, are
fundamental to quantum field theory.
Doreen Fraser has argued against the existence of exact particle-states, and
hence by her lights, the existence of particles in quantum field theory. Her 2008
paper argues that the kind of particle states derivable from non-interacting
fields are not precisely definable in interacting systems. But a lack of precise
definability of particle states is no obstacle to viewing particles as emergent;
it is characteristic of emergent phenomena that they involve approximation
and idealization. Fraser implicitly acknowledges this compatibility when dis-
cussing Wallace’s [34] emergentism:
For this to be a viable response, the cogency of the distinction be-
tween fundamental and less fundamental entities must be defended
and a case must be made for admitting additional, non-fundamental
entities into our ontology. [19, p.858]
Although we have not much discussed the distinction between fundamen-
tal and non-fundamental entities here (though we mention it again at the end
of section 3), we take it that the kind of emergence literature we are building
on does take the distinction to be cogent.10 And the account of novelty we
develop here and elsewhere is, in part, intended to form part of a case for ad-
mitting non-fundamental entities into our ontology.
We’ve so far argued that once one accepts that QFT is a theory of quantum
fields, an account of emergent particles is not far behind. But must one ac-
cept this? Some sources (for example [25]) discuss ‘particle interpretations’ of
field.
10Indeed, as [15] points out, Fraser and Wallace are really in agreement about the non-
fundamentality of particles.
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quantum field theory. Such a view would hold that particles are in fact funda-
mental to QFT. Even in the absence of a settled definition of emergence, we can
agree that if particles are fundamental to a theory they are not emergent with
respect to that theory! But it’s hard to find a worked out version of such a view
in the contemporary literature, although Paul Teller [32] is sometimes held up
as an example. There are good reasons why particle interpretation defenders
are hard to find; Doreen Fraser’s arguments, mentioned above, preclude exact
particle states for interacting systems, and the presence of interesting vacuum
state physics (when particle number is zero), also speaks against QFT being
fundamentally about particles. Credible defenders of the existence of particles
in QFT (e.g. [34] and [35]) think of them in precisely the emergent way that we
advocate here.
We therefore stand by our claim that particles in QFT are emergent if any-
thing is. Granted, one must interpret QFT as being fundamentally about a field,
and one must meet Fraser’s challenge by putting some flesh on the bones of a
general account of emergence. Our main concern here is not to defend the the-
sis of emergentism in general, but rather to counter certain assumptions about
emergence among the emergentists. Once one is working within such a frame-
work, it is natural to say that particles emerge from quantum field theory, and,
as a result of the analogy, to claim that phonons emerge from the crystal lattice.
3 Emergence as robustness with novel explanatory
value
So phonons seem to be well described as an emergent phenomenon, and hence
a good candidate for demonstrating novel and robust behaviour. What can
they teach us about the right way to analyse robustness and novelty?
3.1 Robustness
Robustness is important, but, unlike in the case of novelty, the ingredients of
an analysis have been provided in the literature. To show that a phenomenon
is robust is to show that it survives perturbations of the underlying physics;
in order to be emergent, a phenomenon must not be too fragile or too fleeting.
The robustness we are concerned with here is robustness as it applies to an
actual concrete system: might perturbations of the physics of this crystal arising
from, say, small temperature changes, displacements, or knocks, destroy the
phenomenon of interest? If the answer is ‘yes’ for ordinary small changes to
the system, then the phenomenon would be insufficiently robust to form an
interesting part of higher level physics.
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Phonons are robust in this sense. They exist over long periods of time in
real crystals under different conditions; the nature and use of approximations
in their derivation gives us clues as to the source of their stability. For one
thing, the harmonic approximation holds in a wide range of conditions; De-
bye temperatures are 200 − 500K for many common elements, and are much
higher in some cases. Below these temperatures, we can apply the low temper-
ature Debye model in which the harmonic approximation holds and phonons
do not interact. But the phonon description survives even when we relax the
harmonic approximation; at higher temperatures, we reintroduce anharmonic-
ities and these lead to phonon-phonon interaction. Phonons remain a useful
description at very high temperatures – indeed, they can be used to describe
the system more or less as long as the system remains crystalline.
A great deal of work in the philosophy of physics goes into particular ro-
bustness demonstrations; both Butterfield’s [13] and parts of Batterman’s work
(notably his discussion of the rainbow in his [6]) can be seen as providing such
demonstrations. In fact, we think that the importance of the asymptotic limits
analysis lies much more in its relation to robustness than its connection to nov-
elty. Consider, for example, the use of the thermodynamic limit in explaining
a phenomenon like a phase transition. If we think that the use of the ther-
modynamic limit demonstrates novelty, we fall on the horns of the dilemma
mentioned on p.2: either the use of the limit indicates a failure of reduction,
in which case the phase transition is novel but the novelty is mysterious, or
use of the limit is reducible and it is hard to see where the novelty lies. By
contrast, the use of the thermodynamic limit, properly justified, can easily be
seen as a demonstration of the robustness of phase transition behaviour.11 If
one demonstrates the appropriateness of the thermodynamic limit, in which
the number of particles, N , goes to infinity, then one has demonstrated that
the exact number of particles doesn’t matter, so long as it is large. That is, one
has demonstrated that phase transitions are robust under changes to the size
of the system (as well as many other changes). Of course, there is much work
to be done in justifying the use of the limit. One can see the work of Jeremy
Butterfield [13] as providing such a justification and hence giving an argument
for the robustness of phase transition phenomena.
One must be careful when discussing robustness, for it is easy to conflate
two related ideas connected to perturbations of the underlying physics.12 On
the one hand, we can consider varying the exact conditions of a particular sys-
tem – i.e. changes which the system might actually undergo. On the other, we
can consider varying the very nature and make-up of the system itself – these
are counterfactual or imagined changes which bring out features such as com-
mon structure. There has been considerable interest in the invariance of higher
level theories under changes of the second kind; it goes under the title of ‘uni-
11This point was originally made to one of us by Adam Caulton; this is also a claim with which
we believe Batterman would agree.
12Note that a similar distinction is made in [20] between actual and counterfactual stability.
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versality’ or ‘multiple realizability’. It is demonstrated, for example, by phase
transition behaviour, which is similar in ferromagnets and fluids; see [18, 10].
But we do not think that this kind of behaviour is an essential trait of emer-
gence, despite the historical discussion of ‘multiple realizability’. For suppose
some novel phenomenon is only demonstrated in a specific class of materials
– particular kinds of metal, for example. Now suppose that the phenomenon
persists in a range of circumstances – it survives many knocks, movements and
environmental changes. Is the restriction to metals really relevant to its emer-
gent status? The literature on multiple realizability suggests that it is, but it’s
also famously difficult to understand exactly why this should be the case. By
contrast, the robustness discussed above is obviously relevant to emergence,
precisely because it’s related to the usefulness, lifetime, and observability of
the phenomenon in question.
Why then, is multiple realizability often focussed on in lieu of robustness?
The confusion turns out to be understandable; the features that lead to robust-
ness often lead to multiple realizability as well. In order to demonstrate that
some phenomenon is immune to changes in a given system, one will often,
but not always, highlight features of the phenomenon that render it immune
to changes of the material make-up of a system. The features that make phase
transitions insensitive to particle number may help to make them insensitive to
other details as well. But the connection is not guaranteed. Although phonon
behaviour is demonstrated in a wide range of kinds of crystal, and is thus sta-
ble under counterfactual or imagined changes, we claim that phonon phenom-
ena would count as emergent even if phonons were only realised in, say, alu-
minium lattices.
In addition, multiple realisability has repeatedly (although in our view mis-
takenly – see for example, [37]) featured in arguments against reduction; see
e.g. [17]. In this paper we defend the view that emergent phenomena are best
understood as novel and robust, but a well-established tradition in philosophy
regards claims to emergence as shorthand for the denial of reduction. As such,
multiple realisability is seen to serve as an argument for emergence insofar as
it undermines reductionist claims. Thus multiple realisability and emergence
have often been linked despite the fact that this link detracts from a clear un-
derstanding of both concepts.
3.2 Novelty
The sense in which phonons are novel requires more explanation. We have
established that, if phonons are to be considered novel, their novelty does not
seem to come via the use of approximations and idealizations involving sin-
gular limits.13 But, to our minds, they do fall very nicely under an alternative
13Novelty might otherwise be associated with unpredictability; in-principle unpredictability
would preclude reduction and thus be inappropriate to the phonons case. Bedau, in e.g. [11], has
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account of novelty. [24] argues that novelty might be analysed as explanatory
novelty, and that this explanatory novelty might come about as the result of
particular kinds of changes of variable or quantity between theoretical levels.
In this section, we’ll demonstrate how the phonon example fits into this ac-
count.
Let us start with the simple normal modes example of section 1.1. In this
case, we noted that not only did a move to normal mode variables help us
to solve the equations of motion, but that it might also help with explana-
tory goals. It is quite obviously possible for a phenomenon to be linked to
the normal mode variables rather than the displacement variables; our (admit-
tedly rather contrived) example involved a light that flashed when the central
spring was compressed. The most concise explanation of this phenomenon
appeals only to the normal mode variable η2 and equation (5). That is, after
the variable change we can make a novel abstraction whereby the explana-
tion does not refer to η1. While the phenomenon is explicable in the original
displacement variables, both such variables must be appealed to in order to
provide the explanation. As long as we think that good abstractions lead to
better explanations, the normal mode variables offer a better, more powerful
explanation by virtue of allowing an explanatory abstraction.14
It’s this kind of abstraction that we think is the key to the novelty displayed
by phonons. But the example above might leave one unconvinced, for our nor-
mal mode variable is a function of just two displacement variables, and the
explanation is not terribly complex when translated back into the original vari-
ables. One might very well be able to understand the value of an explanation
that appeals to an equation that calculated x1 − x2 without actually changing
variables. So the sense in which our abstractive explanation is novel may seem
very weak indeed.
The case is different when we move to a more complex example. Just as
in the normal modes example above, we can highlight just a small number of
phonon variables in the explanation of a phenomenon, abstracting away from
other phonon variables. Our phonon variables are linear combinations of a
vast number of atomic displacement variables. So one can imagine that it will
be much harder to ‘see’ the abstraction offered by the move to phonons in the
physics as described by the displacement variables before the variable change.
developed a view of emergence which corresponds to in-practice irreducibility or the requirement
to use computer simulations in bottom-up modelling. We think that his account captures inter-
esting features of emergence, but prefer our account for its greater generality – Bedau’s account
would not cast phonons as emergent.
14The philosophy literature increasingly recognises the importance of abstraction to explanation.
See, for example, [31], or [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 21]. On both mechanistic and counterfactual accounts of
explanation one would expect appropriate abstractions to improve the explanatory goodness and
the range of systems to which the explanation applies: counterfactual explanations [38] identify the
relevant set of counterfactuals only if the explanation is not too fine-grained – that is, only if the
explanandum is proportionate to the explanans; while even defenders of mechanistic explanations,
e.g. [23], note that abstractions aid understanding and explanatory utility.
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The introduction of phonon variables allows for information to be aggre-
gated in new ways and facilitates the selection of a few salient variables to
explain a given phenomenon. Phonons are not merely calculationally powerful
but also explanatorily powerful, at least if we agree that the right abstraction
enhances explanatory power.
However, the use of the harmonic approximation and the number of vari-
ables involved mean that the value of an explanation which appeals only to a
small number of phonon variables may be completely obscure from the per-
spective of the displacement physics. Indeed, from the perspective of the dis-
placement physics, the ‘abstraction’, with its vast number of variables, will not
look like an abstraction at all. It is in this sense that we think that the phonon
description has novel explanatory power.
But this novel explanatory power does not indicate any kind of failure of
theoretical reduction. We know perfectly well what function of the displace-
ment variables leads to the phonon variables, and we can back-translate the
physics into our original description. But that does not mean we can under-
stand why the description thus obtained is explanatorily useful without ap-
pealing to the phonon description. Even though the phonon description is
translatable into the displacement variables, its explanatory value is invisible
unless we choose the right class of variables. One might think that the explana-
tory value of two mathematically intertranslatable sets of variables would be
equivalent; however, consider the counterfactual account of explanation: it’s
apparent that different variable choices would invoke different sets of counter-
factuals and thus different explanations would be available.
This account of novel explanatory power follows that given in [24], but
that account focussed on the relationship between thermodynamics and statis-
tical mechanics, where the mathematical relationships between quantities (the
bridge laws) involve summations, coarse-grainings, and limiting procedures.
These relationships mean that the thermodynamic description possesses less
information than the statistical mechanical one – details are washed out, or ab-
stracted away from, when we move between descriptive levels. So even if we
have a good reduction in the sense that we can derive the thermodynamic vari-
ables from the statistical mechanical ones, we won’t be able to recover the exact
statistical mechanical description from the thermodynamic one. [24] proposed
that this “mathematical irreversibility” was important to novelty.
The phonon example is importantly different. The phonon variables, qkj
are just linear functions of the displacement coordinates uLsα. And, of course,
the latter are also linear combinations of the former. So a complete translation
between descriptions is possible in either direction. In this sense, the two de-
scriptions seem to express a duality, rather than a standard reductive relation-
ship. This leads to a question that has been pressed on us by David Wallace:
if the relationship here is really one of duality, can one nonetheless talk about
novelty and emergence?
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We think (contra [24]) that the answer, at least to the question with regards
to novelty, is yes: explanatory novelty can be displayed even when the de-
scriptive change is entirely reversible. The phonon case demonstrates this. But
emergence is plausibly a relation that is, by definition, asymmetric; one cannot
both think of phonons as emerging from the crystal lattice and of the crystal
lattice as emerging from the phonons. This sounds right to us, and suggests
that mere robustness and novelty may not be enough for emergence. We thus
may wish to define emergence as a relation that holds between less and more
fundamental phenomena.15
4 Conclusion
This paper has aimed to show that a physical phenomenon can be emergent
despite its description not requiring appeal to an asymptotic limit. Phonon be-
haviour is novel and robust, but the phonon variables are not derived by any
limiting procedure, and are, in fact, exactly translatable into the displacement
variables. Nonetheless, we think that the phonon description allows for ex-
planatory abstractions that are not available in the underlying description, and
therefore involves novel explanations. Insofar as they are also robust under
perturbations of the underlying crystal physics, and are described by a theory
that is less fundamental than the basic theory of the crystal, they are emergent.
Thus we draw the broader conclusion that, while asymptotic limits play a
role in robustness analysis, pointing to such limits does not help explain the
novelty of emergent phenomena. Moreover the example of phonons illustrates
that recognisably emergent phenomena neither require limits nor essential ide-
alisation to figure in their derivation from the more fundamental description.
It’s worth, by way of summing up, considering what kind of account of
emergence is on offer in this paper. Strong emergentists often claim that emer-
gent phenomena are in-principle irreducible, and, as such, their account is
rightly regarded as metaphysical; while weak emergentists may claim in-practice
irreducibility and thus a merely epistemological account. Our account, by con-
trast, holds that emergence and reduction are compatible and features both
metaphysical and epistemological aspects. On the one hand, one reason to ac-
cept phonons as emergent is that phonon variables are useful and allow us to
understand phenomena that would be incomprehensible were we forced only
to appeal to displacement variables. On the other hand, the fact that phonons
allow for such good explanations tells us something about the world – phonon
variables pick up on real dependency relations. Despite the fact that we can
translate the phonon description directly into an account in terms of atomic
displacements, phonons are emergent both because they allow for otherwise
15Of course, this leaves open the question of defining a fundamentality relation sufficient to
provide the requisite directionality to emergence, but that project is beyond the scope of this paper.
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unavailable explanations and because, in some sense, they’re really out there.
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